A Journey of Teamwork and Resilience
During the (Australian) winter of 2024, many Qld Rural firefighters volunteered to be deployed to...
RFBAQ
In October 2025 the RFBAQ initiated a QFD RTI search of OBM 118 – Rural Fire Service Queensland - Fleet Asset Warranty / Fault Report forms, and its predecessor form, including attached photos and attached written appraisals, from January 2025 to date, that pertain to Bell manufactured fire appliances in service with QFD.
This is in response to the repeated complaints that the association has received from brigades regarding their new fire trucks.
The RFBAQ has attempted to bring this matter up repeatedly with RFSQ and Fire Service senior management.
With the Queensland fire cycle starting to turn from wet years to dry years, having safe and reliable fire trucks is not a nicety, it is a necessity.
Very few disasters are from a single momentous decision, rather they are a culmination of multiple wrong steps that accumulate into calamity.
History
The former QFES (now QFD) went to market for new medium attack fire trucks for the Rural Fire Service.
There are over 600 medium attack fire trucks across the 93% of Queensland that Rural Fire Brigades protect; these trucks are the workhorses of the fleet.
No new medium attacks had been built since 2019 and the fleet was aging.
This led the RFBAQ to run the Where’s Truckie? Campaign 📽️ Watch here
The Fire Service, being a reactionary organisation, reacted.
The tender specifications that went out for the dual cab medium attack, was a minimum of 1,500 litres usable volume water, and the single cab medium attack was for a minimum 1,800 litres usable volume water (section 3.7 of the build specs).
Multiple suppliers tendered.
On the 15th of December 2022, the RFBAQ met with the then Commissioner and RFSQ senior staff, and raised concerns that there was no consultation on the new medium attacks; this was reflected in the meeting notes -
New Truck Manufacturing Contract & Design:
JC – My question is will the 83 mediums dual & single cabs trucks that are being built, will they have the same layout as the current trucks that are being designed by brigade volunteers or will you be building one of each of the new ones and taking them out to the Operation Strategic working group and the brigades for them to user accept & test before you send them into production? Because you can’t roll out a new truck with no consultation. JG – it will be built to a spec. JC – Pikey was not engaged in any consultation on this, and he is on the working strategic group. GL – we will find out about this. JG – In this new world, we need to focus on the consultative side. JC – you can’t build 83 new trucks without brigade consultation. GL – I am unsure how that process works but I will look into this. JC – let’s say the worst-case scenario that they have awarded a contract for 83 trucks that is different in the design with no consultation. We will be saying this is completely unacceptable. GL – I would be worried about this if that’s the case. IP – we have had companies design pumps for us so changing companies would mean new pump. With FMS training you must have a good understanding of how to use the pumps. JC – Back to the contract the brigades need to be included in any change of design as user acceptance.
On Wednesday 21st of December the RFBAQ met with RFSQ senior officers and QFES procurement staff in Kedron. This meeting was not related to who the QFES decided to award the contract to and why, as that is a commercial decision made by the department. The discussion was related to the specifications of the medium attack build and if brigade members could get hands on the vehicles to assess the look, feel, and usability before 83 trucks were built. We raised that without any brigade member consultation there is the very real possibility that the QFES, which will not exist in 6 months, could leave a 20-year design fail legacy for brigades to live with.
The intellectual property, pump problem.
A fire truck is a water cart, and anything that you add to a design reduces the amount of water that you can carry; so, every decision is a trade of water for stuff.
The successful supplier intended to use a ‘multi-pump’ on the medium attack trucks.
A ‘multi-pump’ is one engine/motor that has a high-pressure pump at one end, and a high-flow pump on the other end. This is a practical weight saving design that precludes the need for two engines/motors, which is heavier.
The RFBAQ raised with the Fire Service that we believed the ‘multi-pump’ was proprietorial to a truck builder, different to those who were awarded the contract.
The Fire Service dismissed this as RFBAQ nonsense, and that no one can own the IP to a pumping system.
Very long story short; the successful supplier decided not to produce medium attack fire trucks with a ‘multi-pump’.
This meant that the medium attacks would need to have two engines/ motors to run the two pumps.
In another meeting, the RFBAQ stated that this would dramatically increase the weight and reduce the ability of the supplier to meet the tender requirements of water carrying capacity and other agreed specifications.
This proposition resulted in a very patronising lecture from the Fire Service regarding truck design, weights, and how they were the industry specialists and we weren’t.
It would seem that gravity in Gympie must be different to that in the Fire Service head office in Kedron.
The dual cab medium attack has a now 1,200 litres usable volume water (300L less than original tender) and the single cab medium attack has a 1,500 litres usable volume water (300L less than original tender).
The RFBAQ then asked the Fire Service if they would be going back to market with a changed set of specifications?
The answer was no.
Hurry up RFBAQ and rubber stamp.
On the 19th of June 2023 the RFBAQ was sent an email full of specifications for medium attacks, 7,000L and 13,000L tankers, medium concept appliances, heavy attack 4x4s and the forecast fleet build including 2 Rural Fire Service hovercraft.
We were given 7 days to peruse these documents as the Fire Service wrote, ‘We are aiming to have this to procurement by the end of June’; and that ‘I’m advised that further delays will jeopardise QFES’ contractual arrangements on these builds.’
The RFBAQ wrote back to the then Commissioner, also cc’ing in many other senior officers –
Subject: RE: Appliance Build Plans 2023 - 2024 and 2024 - 2025
Importance: High
Good morning all,
There are new design appliances that are going into production without prototype testing or user feedback.
There are changes from user feedback relating to the Town Heavies that will allow for more water to be carried without impacting service delivery and I don’t think that these proposals have been looked at.
I have just received and email from REDACTED saying that I’m advised that further delays will jeopardise QFES’ contractual arrangements on these builds.
I have asked for GA’s on these vehicles which the below email says have been sent to other people who are not me, yet it seems I am being asked to sign off on a build programme that will be delayed and jeopardise contractual agreements.
This is not consultation or engagement and I will not sign off on something that I have not been informed of or used as a scapegoat for contractual ineptitude.
On the 27th of September 2023 the RFBAQ again met with the then Commissioner and raised the issue of the new and untested high pressure pump system on the medium attacks. The response was that the Fire Service would get back to us with the testing done on the high-pressure electric pumps, as they have a vendor put up recommendation that they have not decided on, but 83 trucks are coming.
The RFBAQ again asked the Fire Service if they would be going back to market with a changed set of specifications?
Emails and meetings continued with more denial.
Fast forward to 2024, and the RFBAQ elected representatives from across Queensland are starting to field complaints from brigades relating to the reliability of the new build medium attacks.
The Fire Service continues to be in denial.
The RFBAQ wrote to the current Commissioner on the 19th of September 2024 requesting –
Good morning, Commissioner,
I write to you as the responsible officer in QFD with a major safety issue on the new REDACTED RFSQ medium attacks.
I have recently been advised by a number of brigades that have received a REDACTED RFSQ medium attack, that if a drawer, light mast or locker door is not totally secured then the vehicle is immobilised.
While this is a requirement for a mine spec. vehicle, we have off road bushfire fighting requirements that can see light masts ripped off, lockers bent and faulty fabrication points cause vehicle immobilisation on a fire ground through an automatic gearbox override.
The ability for firefighting crew to move a vehicle quickly, without concern for the above circumstances would be the difference between distancing themselves from a moved fire front and a very dangerous burn-over situation imposed on them by a vehicle that has been immobilised.
I believe the same hazard exists for the REDACTED RFSQ tankers.
The new REDACTED RFSQ medium attacks have gone into full production with no prototype built and no field testing by brigades or the RFBAQ who previously had input into vehicle designs.
Can I please request that every brigade that has received one of these REDACTED RFSQ vehicles be immediately contacted and warned of the major safety issue and that it be rectified soonest.
I would also ask that a central collation point of feedback on the new REDACTED RFSQ vehicles be generated to identify any other design flaws or faults and that this be an open programme so that all responses can be seen by all participants?
In addition, the brigades with the new REDACTED RFSQ medium attacks only have a printed manual that has the wrong water capacity. Could you please make available online the correct manual for the REDACTED RFSQ medium attacks?
The A/Chief Officer of the RFSQ responded to our email on the 23rd of September 2024 stating –
Good afternoon Justin
Thank you for your email regarding the new RFSQ Bell medium attack appliances.
The latest medium attack appliances are equipped with a safety feature that prevents operation if a locker is open, the light mast is raised, or a rear drawer is not fully secured.
Firefighters receive training to keep lockers closed on the fireground, thereby significantly reducing the likelihood of embers entering and securing equipment to avoid the risk of it falling out when travelling and causing injury.
I have been advised the light masts are strategically placed behind the lockers to minimise the chance of them being damaged when not deployed. The immobilisation feature also helps prevent damage to these light masts, locker doors and other items as has occurred on several occasions in the past. There is also an override button with detailed information about this safety mechanism can be found on pages 22 and 23 of the user manual.
The original dual cab medium attack appliances were built with a 1500 litre water tank, however RFSQ reduced the capacity to 1200 litre as an appliance weight reduction strategy. There were less than five appliances delivered where the manual was not updated to reflect the water capacity modification. This was promptly identified by RFSQ and has been actioned with amendments issued to the impacted Brigades.
Concerning the development process for the REDACTED RFSQ medium attack appliances, the designs were reviewed by the RFSQ Operational Support Working Group (OSWG) on several occasions. The OSWG contributed suggestions such as including a vice for chainsaw sharpening and a T-piece for the water tank sight tube and the designs were modified to include these suggestions. The feedback from this group has noted that the build quality of these appliances surpasses that of previous models, and the group has shown considerable enthusiasm to produce these appliances.
QFD is committed to continuously improving designs and welcomes suggestions as part of an ongoing improvement process. RFSQ Fleet Delivery welcomes and values the feedback from all volunteer members. The RFSQ Fleet Review project was also discussed as part of the recent Rural Fire Service Advisory Committee (RFSAC) meeting.
Thank you for your interest in this matter.
The RFBAQ wrote back the next day, the 24th of September stating –
Good morning, Ben,
There are three RFBAQ Reps on the OSWG.
I sent your email to them and asked them if they were given access to the inside of the truck with a tour and explanation of the features and benefits and what was new and different from the previous medium attacks? And also asked if they got the specifications/design for the vehicles prior to the trucks being produced?
From their responses there is no possible way that the statement the designs were reviewed by the RFSQ Operational Support Working Group (OSWG) on several occasions could be interpreted as true. The RFBAQ Reps on the OSWG were not even able to access the inside of the cab of the vehicle at any time. There was no discussion on the fitting of a vehicle immobiliser or the risk vs reward of this new technology.
The RFBAQ Reps on the OSWG were very clear on the lack of information regarding the new untested build with no supply of specifications, design features or variations on previous builds.
This means that I reiterate the sentence to the email to the Commissioner 19th September; below
The new REDACTED RFSQ medium attacks have gone into full production with no prototype built and no field testing by brigades or the RFBAQ who previously had input into vehicle designs.
Can I please request that every brigade that has received one of these REDACTED RFSQ vehicles be immediately contacted and warned of the major safety issue and that it be rectified soonest.
I would also ask that a central collation point of feedback on the new REDACTED RFSQ vehicles be generated to identify any other design flaws or faults and that this be an open programme so that all responses can be seen by all participants?
In addition, the brigades with the new REDACTED RFSQ medium attacks only have a printed manual that has the wrong water capacity. Could you please make available online the correct manual for the REDACTED RFSQ medium attacks?
The matter became public on the 2nd of October 2024 when brigade members went to the Courier Mail with their concerns over water capacity, perceived design flaws and over complications in design – Rural Queensland firefighters say new truck is ‘useless’ in the bush.
This then led to 4BC radio interviewing the RFBAQ on the 2nd of October 2024 🔊Listen Here
Acting RFSQ Chief Officer went on 4BC radio on the 3rd of October🔊Listen Here
Then former Operations Strategic Working Group member and RFBAQ vice president, Ian Swadling went on 4BC radio on the 9th of October 🔊Listen Here
The RFBAQ kept raising the matter and kept getting shut down by RFSQ as trucks continued to be rolled out. Even writing to the new minister supporting a brigade that was refusing to sign for a new truck. This elicited a ministerial response written by the QFD -
I understand that the current Medium Attack appliance build was reviewed on several occasions by the Rural Fire Service Operational Support Working Group, comprised of volunteer members, including Rural Fire Brigades Association Queensland representatives. The feedback from this group has noted that the build quality of these vehicles surpasses that of previous models, and the group has shown considerable enthusiasm for the production of these vehicles.
The RFBAQ members on the OSWG, Ian Pike AFSM, and Les Green AFSM both have refuted in writing the above statement.
Another instance of the Fire Service in denial of reality and re-stating proven mistruths. Ministers rely on advice from their departments and trust that the advice they receive is honest, frank and fearless.
The Fire Service has now dealt with this dissent by disbanding the Operations Strategic Working Group. There used to be three working groups to enable consultation between brigade members and the Fire Service. Now there are none.
On the 8th of October 2025 in a RFBAQ/Commissioner/Chief Officer meeting, the RFBAQ raised the matter of a hose reel coming off a medium attack -
JC – Just in regards to this, I received an email from REDACTED RFB, they have a new truck and the hose reel has fallen off. They have also sent some photos of some issues with the construction of that truck. The first officer asked me to bring this up with you. In the letter you will see it says the truck is not fit for task. KJ – If it’s under warranty it will be fixed under warranty. JC – He has identified that part of the build isn’t strong enough to meet requirements. KJ – We will go back to REDACTED on that.
Later that day the RFBAQ supplied the RFSQ Chief Officer with an email (below) and multiple photos from the affected brigade –
Hi Justin
I will send you these pictures in case you do not have them
The first picture is the NP bolts .
Using 8 mm bolts the inner bolts are inserted into tapped holes in the frame , no lock nut or lock tight. The picture shows how far the bolt has worked loose almost fully unwound, These bolts came loose and you can see on the HP reel the bolt is completely missing and the rear bolt is loose.
The second issue is REDACTED is expecting 150kg hose reel to be held on by 4 small bolts the outer bolts are through 3 mm plate with a hole drilled so close to the edge it just tore it away like a tin can . Not to mention it is not bolted to a flat surface it is sitting on the uneven surface area of aluminum chequer plate
Yesterday we were given NO assurance the replacement will be a full redesign and this will have to be on the High Pressure as well ,
We have sent a email letter to the Area Office advising them we will not accept the same design warranty replacement.
We are now in a total fire ban which started yesterday until 21st October .
We have been advised not to use the truck as our running appliance and there is NO time frame of when this will be fixed .
An URGENT Recall or Notice needs to come out from
RFSQ advising all brigades with these trucks to immediately check for metal fatigue and remove bolts apply locktite tighten up the bolts weekly ,
The REDACTED truck was 5 days old, first fire and had loose bolts.
The other issue that I was advised yesterday is the HP pump fails to operate when the micro strainer blocks with no way of cleaning it out unless you climb underneath the truck, shut off the valves under neath the truck .
You then have to remove this tap of the HP flush mounted in front of the back wheels and then unscrew the filter cover and clean out replace and then get under the truck to turn on the shut off valves.
This is dangerous for firefighters on the ground. Our pump failed and we were advised by area office to do the above we found was blocked with Algae. This is a micro fine stainless steel filter.
After 3 months old was completely blocked with Algae. We have been advised to do this after every fire or monthly maintenance,
In October 2025 the RFBAQ again raised our concerns with the new trucks.
This led to a statewide distributed email denying any problems and highlighting the naughtiness of the RFBAQ; there was also a less well publicized internal safety recall dated 9th of October.
The next RFBAQ/Chief Officer meeting on the 12th of November had the below statement from the RFSQ Chief Officer -
KJ – We issued a safety recall immediately after that incident on the basis the engineering was at fault. It was found after that recall notice that the vehicle had an impact with a tree which caused the hose reel to fall off. REDACTED has been involved in looking at a lot of the trucks. There are no identified vehicles with unsecured hose reels on them. We rescinded the recall and issued a safety campaign. The supplier will continue to look at if extra bolts need to be supplied and an extra layer of safety. No fault with the engineering of those trucks were found. IP – REDACTED came out and put reinforced brackets on our reels and heavy-duty reinforced brackets on the alternator. KJ – That’s a proactive effort from REDACTED . JC – We have an RTI on this so we can get a better idea on if there were previous issues and if so, how widely spread it was. KJ – That will go through the process and go out to you in due course. Closing this off.
So that closes the history with a big ‘nothing to see here and all is fine’ from the RFSQ Chief Officer.
Now to the RTI.
With the Fire Service publicly saying ‘nothing to see here,’ yet doing an internal safety recall the RFBAQ thought it important to find out exactly what was happening.
The best way to do that is with the OBM118 Fault Report form that is generated by RFSQ Area Offices across the state, these forms must go to Kedron to be actioned, see Section 3 on the form (this bit is important later in the story, as every tragedy needs a bit of comedic relief).
On the 18th of December 2025 the results of the RTI search were sent to the RFBAQ.
Of all the pages received in the search, every document was supplied by the 4 RFSQ regions.
No documents were received from Office of the Chief Officer, Asset Services Directorate or Strategic Capability Directorate.
👉🏻 Download our compiled findings as a PDF here
The results break down into 6 basic problems –
- Automatic gearbox overheats in 4wd and can cease functioning, can get stuck in 1st gear. This has left trucks immobilised on the fire ground.
- High pressure pump starts then stops, won’t start or pumps at too high a pressure or drops out plastic bung. Drive belts and brackets for high pressure system fail repeatedly.
- Electrics are overcomplicated and result in many and varied outages and faults including vehicle immobilsation.
- Hose reel bolts and mounting platform.
- Vehicle charging faults resulting in boiled batteries and battery collapses, leaving vehicle immobilised.
- Repeated reversing camera failure
Would you trust your life in guaranteeing that the vehicle will not fail on the fireground? As the issues are both across the truck cab chasis and the builder, and there are multiple points of failure, the answer is no.
Our list is indicative, not exhaustive, as the RFBAQ believes that a number of OBM118 forms for the vehicles in the date range were not supplied.
On Thursday 12th of February 2026 the RFBAQ wrote to QFD RTI stating –
Good afternoon, QFD RTI,
In addition to my email of last Wednesday (below) I have re-read your letter of the 18th December 2025.
This led me back to revisiting the documents supplied.
I have noticed that all the forms supplied to me were from RFSQ Regions and that there appeared to be none from either Asset Services or Strategic Capabilities.
The forms, once completed by the RFSQ Regions are required to go to Asset Services, yet no OBM 118 form received has any information in Setion3, which is to be completed by Asset Services.
This leads me to believe that Asset Services did not comply with your request.
Could you please let me know your thought on this and provide a receipt for this email?
On the same day QFD RTI replied –
Good afternoon Justin,
Thank you for your emails of 4 February and 12 February 2026 concerning the decision made on your recent Right to Information application.
In relation to your query about documents held with Asset Services. I was advised by Fleet Delivery in Asset Services that they did not hold any OBM 118 Forms for the date range specified in the scope of your application.
Strategic Capability for RFSQ also did not hold any documents responsive to the scope of the application.
In relation to the matter raised in your email of 4 February 2026 regarding how some OBM 118 forms for REDACTED , REDACTED and REDACTED were not provided as part of the documents for the application. Searches were conducted within the RFSQ regions for all OBM 118 forms that were completed within the date range specified in the scope of your application, being from January 2025 to 30 October 2025. So if there were forms that were completed either before January 2025 or after 30 October 2025, they would not have been considered relevant to the scope of your application.
I hope the above is of assistance to you.
Later the same Thursday –
Good afternoon, RTI
Thankyou for your response.
The OMB118 form that is completed by RFSQ in the regions is to be submitted to asset services. I have quite a few OBM118 forms supplied to me by you that were required to be submitted to asset services for actioning.
Yet no OBM118 forms from asset services were supplied by asset services in response to my request, as you state below - I was advised by Fleet Delivery in Asset Services that they did not hold any OBM 118 Forms for the date range specified in the scope of your application
Where did those forms go then?
The final piece of correspondence regarding this RTI search is from QFD RTI on Thursday late afternoon –
Good afternoon Justin,
Thank you for your email. The Right to Information and Privacy Unit in QFD is responsible for administering the Right to Information function for the agency and ensuring the agency is meeting its obligations under the Information Privacy Act 2009, therefore, I am not sure if we are the right unit to be responding to your question about whether the forms make their way to Asset Services.
I can refer your query to Fleet Delivery, Asset Services and RFSQ if you like.
Here is the final failure of the QFD in the production and collation of what is wrong with these vehicles. The OBM118 forms are either lost/ignored by Kedron or they have decided to refuse to comply with a RTI search.
